One must assume from reading the Sandie Peggie judgment that the tribunal was more concerned with discouraging further litigation than with giving full and fearless effect to the Equality Act.
At the heart of this case lies a straightforward question: does a biologically male employee have a legal right to undress in a female-only changing room? For Women Scotland answered that question at the Supreme Court: women-only spaces are for biological women.
Yet instead of applying that binding precedent, the tribunal awarded Sandie Peggie a technical win based primarily on procedural failings and delay, while simultaneously undermining the legitimacy of her core complaint. The effect is a ruling that says: “You were treated badly, but only because you reacted to a situation we pretend has no legal significance.”
For Women Scotland affirmed that sex in law means biological sex – not gender identity. That matters because single-sex spaces exist specifically to recognise biological difference. The tribunal contradicted that point. It acknowledged that one person was biologically female and the other biologically male, then declared that this distinction becomes irrelevant once clothing is removed – precisely when women are at their most vulnerable.
In doing so, the tribunal ignored sex-based protections contained within the Equality Act at the very moment they are most needed.
The technical win deserves scrutiny. It is a sophisticated manoeuvre: the judgment is generous enough to grant Peggie a partial win, but not so generous as to uphold all her claims. It is, arguably, a savagely ingenious move – providing just enough success to dull enthusiasm for appeal, while ensuring that the most legally explosive question continues to bend to stonewall. The message is unmistakable: accept your crumbs and walk away.
The outcome is a legally incoherent position: sex is relevant enough to identify, but too controversial to enforce. The tribunal elevated employer preference above statutory entitlement. Because NHS Fife allowed a biologically male colleague into a women-only space, the court treated Peggie’s objection as unreasonable. When policy choices override legal rights, those rights have already been hollowed out.
One of the most troubling passages asserts there is insufficient evidence that a male person poses greater risk than a woman does. That is a fundamental misunderstanding of safeguarding. Safeguarding is not reactive – it is preventative. It exists because vulnerability begins at exposure. Voyeurism, indecent viewing, intimidation – these harms do not require physical contact. The tribunal’s logic would justify installing smoke alarms only after the fire has started.
In addition, there is a distinct tone of moral superiority: gender-critical beliefs are technically lawful, yet treated as socially defective. The implication is that Peggie was protected not because she was right, but because the law is obliged to tolerate her. A right that survives only in silence is no right at all.
This judgment leaves employers without clarity and women with fewer rights. The purpose of a judgment is not to maintain institutional comfort. It is to state the law. Peggie’s case presented a direct conflict – gender identity versus sex-based boundaries. The tribunal refused to resolve it in accordance with precedent. That refusal is the failure.
This is why Peggie should, in my view, appeal. Not for a different trophy, but because the law needs the courage this judgment lacked. If allowed to stand, it will be provided as proof of the proposition that single-sex rights are discretionary. That women’s privacy is conditional.
The emotional toll of continuing is something we should all recognise. Sandie Peggie has already shown a resilience most people will never be asked to demonstrate. But rights that depend on the stamina of those who defend them are already eroding.
Where fear governs the interpretation of rights, those rights are already being lost.
