Ian Kelly is the Senior Parliamentary Assistant to Greg Smith MP.
Despite its torrid state, HS2 has been remarkably resilient as an idea and as a major project. That seems remarkable given that the real-world cost has ballooned to over £200 billion, forced hundreds of landowners to sell up, ruined thousands of acres of countryside, felled hundreds of ancient woodlands, and left both rural and urban communities broken under the weight of its construction.
The project’s latest cost-benefit ratio stands at nearly 1.1, which is not far off a situation whereby it is costing more than it can deliver. In any case, there will be no conceivable benefit if ever until at least the late 2030s, by which point the technology used will have been superseded by whichever innovation makes its way to our shores from Europe or East Asia – two regions that are far ahead of the UK in high-speed rail and have been for some time now.
Last week the National Audit Office blew a hole through one of the project’s original key drivers – relieving capacity on the existing network, specifically on the West Coast Main Line. It reported that HS2 will likely cause an overall reduction in capacity, around 17 per cent, because of fewer seats on HS2’s trains compared to those currently used on the WCML between London, Birmingham, and Manchester.
Among other recommendations the NAO advises the Government to “incentivise people to travel at different times or to not travel by rail”, which to address would require “expensive and disruptive” upgrades to the existing network, which would likely create “major disruption”. Such changes primarily include lengthening platforms at principal stations and installing more modern tracks.
Anyone who has taken the train from London to Birmingham or Manchester will be quivering at this prospect. The WCML is the busiest main line in Europe, carrying 35 million passengers and up to 10 per cent of the UK’s freight traffic annually. It has been subject to numerous problems including faulty outdated infrastructure and poor service provision from its biggest franchisee, Avanti West Coast. Chronic staffing shortages had until earlier this year caused perpetual cancellations and disruption, forcing AWC’s leadership to be hauled before the Transport Select Committee.
A permanent capacity reduction caused by HS2 using the WCML gives every incentive for passengers to switch to their cars – so much for HS2’s purported environmental credentials. The NAO report warns that “this may constrain economic growth in the region over the long term and increase environmental costs.”
What went wrong with HS2? Several factors contributed to HS2 becoming the most expensive and complex infrastructure project in Europe, many of which were exacerbated by the impact of COVID-19. But to place the blame directly on COVID-19 is letting project bosses and the Department for Transport off too easily.
In 2020 for example, to cut costs HS2 Ltd revised the commercial terms for the main civil construction contracts by reducing the financial risks to contractors after it became clear that the size of these contracts gave an inflated picture of these companies’ financial resources. The revised terms were assured and approved by the Department.
This shows that rather than attempt to address the underlying problems that have plagued HS2 long before COVID took hold, the Department chose to prop up an inherently flawed project by pumping it with yet more taxpayers’ money. This not only exacerbates the black hole in the Department’s finances – it also prolongs the project’s construction phase, during which the taxpayer sees no benefit whatsoever, by effectively endorsing the sluggish way that the main works contractors are going about building the line, which is already delayed by at least 2-3 years.
The incoming party leader must take this seriously. A good start would be to make clear to voters that HS2 was an idea born under the last Labour government in 2009 at a time when it was assumed that a project of this size and scale would create a bottom to stabilise the 2008 financial crisis. Fifteen years later, rather than delivering on its promise of more trains running more frequently at higher speeds, it is instead draining the public purse faster than an express Pendolino from New Street to Euston.
We as a party and as HM’s Official Opposition must treat this as the financial emergency that it has truly become and demand that, for the good of the country, the new Government properly scrutinise this and other major infrastructure projects being delivered under the banner of “national economic growth”.
We owe it to hard-working people to ensure the right infrastructure is delivered. We moved towards that with the cancellation of Phase Two, the strongest sign yet that HS2 has to go. The commitment to reinvest £36 billion in savings from Phase Two’s cancellation, despite the expected cost of reversal procedures totalling around £100 million according to the NAO, is welcome, though the new Government has not yet re-affirmed the expectations set by the previous Secretary of State for Transport to reinvest these savings.
The bill covering Labour’s one million pothole repairs per year will eat up a good amount of that – especially in areas where HS2’s relentless HGV movements have caused more than just the odd pothole.
Yet this contradicts Labour’s stated goal to build HS2 in full. With Labour mayors now in charge of both Birmingham and Manchester, there will be significant downward pressure on No. 10 not just to deliver but to enhance the project. But, as the NAO has shown, there are no good options left with HS2.
This is a golden opportunity for the next Leader of the Opposition and for the Shadow Secretary of State to expose HS2 for what it is – an unaffordable vanity project that is designed purely to prop up the construction industry, at the expense of taxpayers and rail passengers. It is an opportunity to demonstrate that we are the party of economic sense. We owe it to hard-working people, many of whom are reliant on the seats that HS2 will cause to disappear.
