Bob Seely is a former MP for the Isle of Wight, and a Foreign Affairs Select Committee member
The Conservative Party prides itself on protecting Britain’s national security and strategic advantage. The last government introduced the National Security and Investment Act, which gave ministers the power to intervene in foreign investment and acquisitions in 17 sensitive sectors from countries of concern. The Procurement Act also enabled ministers to exclude suppliers from public procurement under national security grounds.
Besides thoughtful interventions from Kemi Badenoch, China has been absent in this leadership campaign. From Hong Kong and Taiwan to human rights and critical industries, evidence-based debate over how the UK should navigate the evolving threats over the past decade and approach the global competition between the West and China has been missing.
In 2023, the head of the Five Eyes domestic security agencies (UK, US, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand) warned about China’s targeting of cutting-edge technology. One vital area is genomics, which sits within the life sciences and is already worth billions. Genomics isn’t the first thing that comes to mind when thinking about national security; that explains why it has been overlooked and exposed to China – which has set an industrial strategy to dominate this sector globally.
Genomics, which focuses on DNA structure, evolution, and editing, will transform our world. Genetic information has been called the ‘new gold’. It is crucial for understanding illnesses, developing drugs, and harnessing gene editing technology to create more resilient human, animal, or plant organisms.
Since the COVID-19 pandemic, the industry has soared. In healthcare, genomics is vital for preventative treatment, with the NHS harnessing genomic technology to improve public health and aiming to become the first national healthcare system to offer whole genome sequencing as part of routine care.
National security and intelligence officials have warned about China’s ‘whole-of-state’ approach to dominating critical industries and the dual-use application of this technology. Beijing has classified genomics and biotechnology as a national security concern and a priority industry under its ‘Made in China 2025’ plan.
That requires large datasets and know-how. In 2021, the US National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence warned that Chinese genomics company BGI Group “may be serving… as a global collection mechanism for the Chinese government [and] poses similar threats in the biotechnology sector as Huawei does in communications”.
Whoever is in the White House next, Washington is unlikely to change course over its genomics approach. Beijing’s ambitions have prompted lawmakers from both main parties to propose the BIOSECURE Act, which would ban certain Chinese companies such as BGI and its former subsidiary MGI Tech from federal contracts.
Compared to the US, which designated BGI as a “Chinese military company” and blacklisted subsidiaries, the UK is sleepwalking into another national security failure. In 2021, BGI was awarded a £11 million public contract for COVID-19 testing, and 16 academic institutions across the UK have worked with BGI or MGI.
Despite being called a “danger point” by the former Science Minister, there is little clarity over how Labour is protecting Britain’s world-leading genomics sector from high-risk entities. British DNA data remain exposed as companies such as BGI are subject to Article 7 of Beijing’s National Intelligence Law, which mandates Chinese companies to share data with state authorities.
We saw this risk materialise with Oxford Nanopore. It recently threatened BGI and MGI with legal action for stealing trade secrets to develop its own technology.
The UK is not acting robustly enough. Under the Procurement Act, ministers now have the power to exclude genomics companies of concern from public contracts on national security grounds. Yet Labour ministers are unlikely to trigger this. Legislation also does not prevent private sector healthcare companies from using BGI’s sequencing services or purchasing MGI’s equipment which undermine Britain’s economic competitiveness.
In the research sector, the Research Collaboration Advice Team guides academic institutions on partnerships. Organisations can plug into advice from the National Cyber Security Centre. In the genomics sector, the burden of making complex security decisions rests with organisations that may not view their industry through the lens of geoeconomics.
The UK’s world-leading status for genomics research necessitates a delicate balance. Simply excluding Chinese researchers from biomedical databases (including UK Biobank) would undermine international collaboration and hamper innovation. Decisionmakers must protect national security without stopping genomics research from moving forward.
A more transactional approach with China is required. Access to Western genomic resources should be reciprocated with fair access to Chinese resources since Beijing has restricted access by foreign entities on national security grounds. Restrictions should be targeted on companies of concern with clear links to the Chinese state, ensuring they cannot access British DNA as there is no way to give sufficient assurances about data privacy.
The next Conservative leader must also encourage a China strategy that is forward-thinking and joined up. According to the Centre for Security and Emerging Technology, Beijing is using its hybrid economic system and state subsidies to help its national champions, BGI and MGI, dominate market share across the genomics industry and supply chain.
A ‘whole-of-government’ response has been missing. The next leader can show competence and vision by tackling this complex national security issue. A more robust approach to entities linked to hostile states accessing our world-leading genomics sector will ensure Britain benefits from the advancements this technology will bring. It would demonstrate ‘securonomics’ in action.
