ANALYSIS: What Ethiopia’s political elite must do to end violence

Ethiopia’s seemingly peaceful transition in 2018 under Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali can largely be attributed to waves of legislative and political reforms. This after years of protests against the administration of the former ruling party, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front.

But the structural drivers of conflict remained, and so the country was again engulfed by episodes of inter-group violence – the latest outbreaks more severe than in the two decades before 2018.

This violence continues despite a national dialogue established in December 2021 to address the drivers of the conflict and restore stability. These drivers include clashes over power, resources and the identity of the Ethiopian state between political elites of the Amhara, Oromo and Tigray identity groups, among others.

Some of Amhara and Oromia’s political elite have rejected the dialogue process and are in armed conflict with the government. The Tigrayan elite’s position so far is unclear – and the National Dialogue Commission has yet to select participants and agenda items from the region.

Calls have been made to temporarily pause the dialogue to allow the commission to recalibrate its approach. This would create space for reengagement with the parties that rejected the process, improving the legitimacy of its outcomes.

Could pushing the pause button stop the fighting long enough for parties to negotiate a peaceful solution? The answer lies in understanding the background.

The 1995 Constitution made ethnicity a salient feature of politics and state-society relations, creating conflicts among competing groups. Both the pre- and post-2018 protests and clashes are largely due to the mobilisation of aggrieved groups along ethnic lines. Factionalism and infighting have characterised organised political movements before and since 2018.

The National Movement of Amhara, previously a strong advocate for the Amhara ethno-nationalist cause, was disrupted after joining Abiy’s Cabinet following the 2021 election. This shift in leadership gave the Fano movement more prominence in Amhara politics, which faces its own factionalism and infighting. The same occurred in the ruling Prosperity Party, with some notable figures pushed out or expelled due to disagreements regarding the formation of the party.

In short, Ethiopia’s political ‘house’ has been in disarray.

Since 2020, tensions have escalated among various political organisations within and outside the ruling party. This led to war between the federal government and Tigrayan forces from 2020-2022. Tension between the government and the Oromo Liberation Front led to the emergence of the Oromo Liberation Army faction, which has opted for armed resistance. As a result, part of Oromia has become one of the most affected conflict zones in the country.

Since the 2022 Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) between Tigrayan forces and the federal government, the Amhara Region has also become engulfed in violence. Tensions between the federal government and some segments of Amhara political elites, driven largely by competing nationalisms, have fuelled clashes. The federal government’s move to integrate the regional special forces into the federal security apparatus after the CoHA was signed – though important for security sector reform – triggered armed conflict that continues.

The CoHA has so far successfully silenced the guns in Tigray and improved relations between the federal government and the region’s interim administration. However, fully implementing the CoHA may require reverting to the pre-war status quo, which includes restoring the Tigrayan regional state’s authority in the disputed areas of Raya and Wolkayt. But this could intensify the Amhara forces’ nationalistic grievances, making it even harder to negotiate a settlement between Amhara and the federal government, at least in the near future.

Amhara nationalism is nascent; Oromo nationalism is consolidated but riven by factionalism; Tigray nationalism is consolidated but in a state of ambivalence since the CoHA. Effective national dialogue will be difficult while these social and political forces are in conflict with the federal government. Equally worrying is the severity of polarisation in the Ethiopian political space. Divisions have incentivised extremism rather than moderation, and zero-sum politics over a win-win outcome.

This can lead to ‘ethnic outbidding’ – when ethnic political groups adopt a radical position to outbid their opponents in order to garner support from their ethnic base. In Ethiopia, this is exacerbated by the fact that these groups, save for Tigray, are not represented by a single and dominant ethnic political organisation.

The National Dialogue Commission should pause the dialogue process on the basis of the multipartiality principle. This is ‘a practice in intergroup dialogue facilitation that focuses on balancing social power, independent of and in contrast to dominant norms in society [with] equal attention … given to the multiple identities and experiences of all group members, target and agent, so that no one group is being exploited for the benefit of another.’

Adopting multipartiality requires the commission and government to recognise the root causes of Ethiopia’s political problems, the current armed conflicts, and the challenges all political actors face. The commission could start by pausing the process, reassessing and restarting it, while urging the government and armed opposition groups to agree to a ceasefire.

The commission could also pressure warring parties to cease hostilities by drawing lessons from the CoHA process and ongoing mediation efforts between the Oromo Liberation Army and the government. This would buy time to ensure that the dialogue and other mediation processes complement one another. Although the commission’s mandate on mediation is contested, a well-designed and serious commitment to the semi-mediator route could earn it legitimacy.

And the government could benefit from unilaterally declaring a nationwide ceasefire, as suggested by some international actors. This would help legitimise the national dialogue process and address Ethiopia’s political quagmire. To improve its chances of success, the government should make its ‘peacemaking through mediation’ approach comprehensive and extend an olive branch to the armed groups in Amhara.

Ethiopia’s competing political elites need to set aside factionalism and ethnic rivalry in favour of a negotiated political settlement through dialogue. The international community could also help by collectively pushing for a nationwide ceasefire and fostering trust among competing forces in a genuine dialogue.

Tegbaru Yared, Researcher, Horn of Africa Security Analysis, Institute for Security Studies (ISS) Addis Ababa

(This article was first published by ISS Today, a Premium Times syndication partner. We have their permission to republish).