Louise Brown has been a parliamentary candidate, is a teacher, and Director of Educational Partnerships. She is a broadcaster on local radio.
In recent years, political labels like “right-wing” have become less helpful in describing figures within the Conservative Party.
This is particularly true when it comes to politicians like Kemi Badenoch and Robert Jenrick, both of whom are often lazily branded as “right-wing” for their cultural or policy positions. However, a closer look at their platforms reveals a much more nuanced ideological landscape, one better understood through the frameworks offered by thinkers like David Goodhart, Francis Fukuyama, and Ed West. The simplistic “right-wing” label flattens the complexities of their political stances and fails to account for the broader shifts within British conservatism.
The term “right-wing” traditionally conjures images of free-market policies, small government, and a resistance to social change. However, this definition is increasingly outdated in the current political environment, especially when applied to figures like Badenoch and Jenrick. Both of them engage with cultural and economic issues in ways that defy the traditional boundaries of the right-left spectrum.
Kemi Badenoch, for instance, is often identified as a staunch cultural conservative due to her critiques of “woke” ideology and identity politics. She has spoken out against what she sees as the divisive effects of critical race theory and extreme progressive movements, emphasising instead a sense of shared national identity and meritocracy. While these positions might align her with the “right,” her political appeal goes beyond these reductive categories. Her focus on cultural cohesion and a balanced view of individual rights vs. collective identity speaks more to the divide between what David Goodhart calls the *Somewheres* and the *Anywheres*.
In his book *The Road to Somewhere*, Goodhart argues that modern political divides are no longer best understood as left vs. right but as a divide between *Somewheres*—those who feel rooted in local, cultural identities—and *Anywheres*, who are more globally minded and socially mobile. Badenoch’s policies resonate strongly with the *Somewheres*, who feel alienated by rapid cultural changes and globalisation. Her critiques of identity politics and focus on community values reflect the concerns of people who feel they have been left behind by a progressive, cosmopolitan elite.
Robert Jenrick, while often positioned as a technocratic, moderate figure, also transcends the traditional “right-wing” label. His policies on housing, planning reform, and infrastructure investment are aimed at addressing local issues that affect the daily lives of the British public. His approach to politics is pragmatic, not ideological, and focuses on ensuring that local communities have the tools they need to thrive in an increasingly globalised economy. In this sense, he too can be seen as addressing the concerns of the *Somewheres*—those who feel disconnected from the rapid changes driven by globalisation and urbanisation.
By focusing on the needs of these rooted communities, Jenrick and Badenoch are not easily aligned with traditional right-wing ideals of free-market orthodoxy or minimal state intervention. Their politics is less about adhering to rigid economic theories and more about preserving the social and cultural fabric of Britain in a way that resonates with those who feel culturally and economically disenfranchised.
To further understand this shift in Conservative politics, it’s helpful to consider the critique of liberalism offered by thinkers like Ed West. West has argued that liberalism, particularly in its left-leaning form, has failed to maintain social cohesion and has alienated large swathes of the population. Liberalism’s emphasis on individual rights and identity politics, he suggests, has undermined the shared national identity that is crucial for social stability. This critique aligns with the broader post-liberal movement that has emerged in response to the failures of progressive liberalism.
Fukuyama, in his book *Liberalism and Its Discontents*, takes this analysis a step further. He argues that liberalism, when taken to its extremes, becomes self-defeating. The liberal ideal of maximising individual freedom has, in many cases, given rise to illiberal identity politics. Fukuyama contends that by prioritising individual identity over collective social bonds, liberalism risks creating a fragmented and divided society. This dynamic is evident in the way identity politics has become a central, and often polarising, issue in modern political discourse.
Janan Ganesh has added to this conversation by illustrating how the focus on the left-right spectrum misses these nuances and how in crunch moments when core freedoms are are on the line liberals can just be too flaky. Cavendish similarly argues that the focus on free-market liberalism, typically associated with the political right, neglects the small-c conservative focus on community and social stability. She criticizes the excessive reliance on economic liberalism — deregulation, privatisation, and global trade — that has often left Somewheres feeling abandoned and dislocated in their own country.
Both Badenoch and Jenrick are navigating this post-liberal landscape. Badenoch’s rejection of identity politics can be seen as a direct response to the fragmentation caused by extreme liberalism, while Jenrick’s focus on practical, community-based policies seeks to rebuild the local bonds that have been eroded by globalisation and unchecked market forces. In both cases, their political approaches are informed by a critique of liberalism’s failure to address the real, lived concerns of ordinary people
What we are witnessing within the Conservative Party is not merely a continuation of right-wing politics but a more profound realignment in response to the failures of both liberalism and traditional conservatism. Badenoch’s cultural conservatism and Jenrick’s pragmatic localism represent two sides of this realignment. While both politicians are concerned with national identity and community, they approach these issues from different angles, reflecting the broader divide between *Somewheres* and *Anywheres*.
This new political landscape is not easily captured by old ideological labels. The simplistic “right-wing” tag obscures the fact that both Badenoch and Jenrick are responding to a deeper cultural and economic crisis—a crisis rooted in the failures of liberalism to maintain social cohesion in an age of rapid change. As Fukuyama and West suggest, the liberal order that once seemed unassailable is now under strain, and new political frameworks are emerging to address its shortcomings.
Rather than viewing Badenoch and Jenrick as simply “right-wing,” it’s more accurate to see them as part of a post-liberal conservative movement that seeks to preserve social order, national identity, and local community in the face of global pressures. Their politics is not about free markets vs. state control but about rebuilding the bonds of community and shared identity that have been weakened by decades of liberal orthodoxy.
In short figures like Badenoch and Jenrick are responding to deeper cultural and ideological shifts. They represent a post-liberal future, where the debates are not market versus state control but about identity, community and the preservation of social order in an increasingly fragmented world. both are likely to play a key role in shaping its future direction. But to understand this we must move beyond outdated labels and recognise the deeper ideological shifts taking place in British politics today.
